J HE YEAR we are about to end has been very unusual in that it was characterized by one of the most rapid increases in the price level, and by one of the sharpest nlrops in reported real output in the postWorld War II period. In order to understand the view we hold at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis regarding the outlook for 1975, it is necessary to take time to develop, in some detail, the interpretation we apply to the events in 1974.
First, let's review some definitions of economic concepts. Vie all talk about inflation; we hear a hot about inflation; but I thank that there are some inaccurate ideas prevailing in time press and in the niinmds of the general public as to what the phenomenon called inflation really is. Inflation is simply a process involving erosion of the purchasing power of a nation's money supply -that is, simply a deterioration in the exchange rate between money and goods and services.
I use the \vornl 'process' hecatsse inflation is an ongoing phenomenon; it is continuous, although not necessarily' at a steanly rate. This is distinct from a price increase, or an increase in the price level that is not continuous, or ongoing. l'hat distinction becomes very crucial to understanding the forces influencing our economy and general welfare in 1974.
Time general phenomenon of a cosmtinuous inflation is due basically to nionetamy causes. Nominally, we attribute inflation to a growth in the nations money supply which prodmmces a growth of total spending at a rate faster than the growth in real output -in other words, too mmmcli money cimasing too few goods. Since inflation is a nlecline in the purchasing power of money, I tlunk that there can be little quarrel with the general idea that inflation is--a monetary phenomenon.
I lo\vever, wide a persistent inflation occurs only as time growth ism money-supply' and resmmltant total demanil for goods and services exceeds the total supply of goods and services, a temporary or transitory inflation can resmmlt fn-om forces which produce a decline in the supply, or ability to produce goods, while demand continues to grow. In other words, a temporary bulge in the rate of inflation, \vhmle the economy is adjusting to a new lngher equilibrium price level, is not necessarily associated with a marked acceleration in the rate of growth of the money supply. On the contrary, it can be associated \vith a steady, continuing growth of the money supply and aggregate demand for goods and services, while at the same time there is a sudden drop in the economy's real economic capacity.
It is 00ff view that both a persistent monetary mBation and a temporary hulge imm time rate of inflation occssrred in 1974 in time Unitenl States',mnd in many other countries of the worldl. Our analysis holds timat the trend growth in the nations money supply' this y'ear antI over time past fotmr years is consistent with an ongoing, sustained rate of increase imm the general price of 12 percent. Tbmis is an increase that we do not believe can be explained by the growth of the money supply, either this year or over the past few years.
We attnhmmte about Imaif of time immcrease imi the general price level this year to the trend growth of the money stock, and about half to forces which constrained the real economic capacity of the U. S. economy. We consider these forces to have only a one-tisne, transitional effect, although the process is distrihnmted over a period of time that has so-far lasted about fommr quarters.
Given this vie~v,we would argue that time rate of increase of the general price level will decelerate to the range of 5 to 6 percent per year, even if the rate of growth of the nation's money supply were to continue at about the same average pace observed over the past several years. To put it another way, we think about one-half of the inflation observed this year was of the persistent excessive aggregate demand variety, and about one-half was of the temnporary, or transitory, variety. Time latter occurred as the economy adjusted to a lower real econonnic capacity, and therefore, a higher equilibrium level of average prices.
Allow me to take a few moments to review the developments of time past few years. During 1967 and 1968 timere is no doubt that stabilization policies in the United States were highly expansionary. This contributed both to an acceleration in the rate of inflation and to a high rate of real output growth accompanied by a low rate of unemployment. In 1969 monetary actions ttmrned decisively restrictive as monetary p0'-icvmakers songht to ctnrh the builnling inflatitnsar pressures. The actions taken in 1969, as indicated by a marked reduction in the rate of growth of the nation's nioney stock, produced a slowdown in aggregate demand in 1970 and resulted in conditions that were characteristic of the previous business cycle recessions in the post-World War II period. Quite appropriately (and some time after the fact) time National Bureau of Economic Research declared that a recession had occmmrred, lasting approximately froni November 1969 to November 1970.
During 1970 the rate of growth of the nmation's money stock reaccelerated as pohicymakers sought to cushion the weakening economy. At the same time, time Federal Government's htmdget produced a deficit, indicating ( according to the usual analysis) that fiscal policy was also stimulative.
In 1971 the growth of tine money stock accelerated further and, then again ism 1972 another step-up occurred. It was not surprising that growth in the demand for goods and services rose markedly through this period. I would argue that forces were at work contributing to the building of a familiar inflationary process, wherein too mmmcli money is chasing too few goods as the economy approaches its real economic capacity. Thus, we saw an erosion of the purchasing power of the nation's cmmrrency.
The inflation was not directly observable in the second half of 1971 and througimommt 1972 since the Government chose to impose a rather rigid system of wage and price controls. These controls, if nothing else, had time effect of holding down the reported increases in prices, and therefore, time rise in the price indices. However, the system of controls began to break down, as was inevitable, anti early-in 1973 the Administration switched to a mmmcli less rigid program of controls, thereby allowing a catch-up to begin. Thrommghout 1973 the rate of price increase, as meastmred both by the consumer price index and the GNP deflator, accelerated sharply as time process of dc-control allowed time markets to begin to take us back to conditions consistent with nmnderlying economic forces.
Time growtlm of time nation's money stock in 1973 was somewhat slower than the rate experienced mm 1972, hut was still at a very high rate by histtricai standards. According to sonic emupirical researelm at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lommis, even though the rate of price increase in 197:3 was mmmcli mon'e rapid than implied by time growth in the money' stock timat y-ear and in time years inmuediateiv prior, time price level at the end of 1973 was below the one immdicated by' the growth of the money stock over the prior few years. imm other words, this research indicates that in the second half of 1971 and throughout 1972 the price level was being held below what the prevailing monetary growth would have implied. Therefore, in 1973 the high rate of price ines'casc was simply' the expected consequence of the removal of controls and return to time rate of exchange between mommey and goods that would bring us back to eqtmilibrium conditions. In otlmer words, after the re-adjustment or "catch-up" process was completed, we would expect a level of prices, as innhcated by' monetary' growth, to prevail.
It is our jmsdgmnemmt that time distortiomms 0mm prices caused by' controls and dc-controhs had pretty well worked tlmemsehves out by tIme esmd of 1973. Moreover, we would argue that time rate of inflation imi 1974 would have been less thami in 1973 (and only about half wlmat hmas actually been observed km 1974) if there imad not beemm a successiomm of wimat have become knowmm as "special factors" which were providing further shocks to the economy.
One of time factors affecting relative prices (and therefore production) in the past few years is rchated to the depreciatiomi of the dollar that occurred since 1971. The fact that the depreciatiomm occurred immchcates that the U. S. price level was out of line witim its major trading partimers. Wimat hmanl happeneni was that in time late 196Cs amid early' 197 0 s, as the Usmited States was pursmung immfiationarv policies associated with large Government deficits and a high rate of military spending, the intermiationah agreemnent on exchange rates (known as i3retton Wtoods) served to hold down prices of foreign goods to American consumers and producers, while raising prices of otmr goods to foreigners.
This means that for a number of years we were experiencismg hess inflatiomm to time extent timat foreign goods, in relative terms, became successively cheaper. Also, our goods were imot beimig demanded imm the same quantities thiat wouhd have otherwise occurred-But ommce time dollar was permnitted to depreciate, there were sharp shifts in underlying conditions. Demand for some goods deehmmed and demand for other goods increased. hrimmging about marked shifts in relative prices to U, S. eonsnmmmers. Time prices of foreigmi goods rose sharply', wimile time prices of ommr goods to foreigners decreased sharply' in terms of their currencies. Since foreign goods were now more expensive to us, Americamm commsnmers amid producers shifted timeir dernamids away' frOmmm forcigmm goods and towarnhs time rehativehy chmeaper Asnericamm produced goods. Simiharhy, the now cheaper Anmcricasm goods caused foreigmmers to step-up their purchase orders of our products. The adjnstmnent to these sudden changes imi rehative prices rmattmrahiv wonmhd he distributed over aim extended period of time.
1mm aclditiomi to time simifts in demammd and time associated changes ui rehath-e prices caused by' time dollar niepreciation, time Anmericami social and political process resmmited imi nlecisions to shmi{t the mmtihization of some of our nations resomsrces away from time produetiomi of comiventional goods and services and towards a healthier living environment and a safer working environment. These laws took many forms, but basically they have been geared towards less pollution of the air by our factories and automobiles; less pollution of our nation's rivers and a safer working environment, as well as safer atmtomobiles to transport American citizens. These decisions to re-allocate a share of our resources towards these objectives mmaturahiy iniphied significant shifts imm demand, for both hahor and other resources, away from time production of" widgets" amid towards the production of clean air, clean water, and greater safety.
Imm time language of ecommon-mists, these decisions essentially-amounted to a change in our society's commstmmnption basket, wherein we decided to forego the productiomm of some goods, both now amid in tIme future, imm favor of the rather immtangibhe benefits of less poilutiomm ammd more safety'. Givemi limmmited resommrces, such a re-allocation of resource mmtihzatiou necessitates a rednmetiomm imi oimr abihity: to prodtmce tine usual types of goods amid 1 services. 1mm otlmer words, we muade a social and political deeisiossm w'hmichm restmited imi an absolute decrease imm ommr productiomi capacity' for goods and services.
Furtliemmore, there were otimer factors at work constraining the domestic supply of goods. Crops around the world were mmot good in 1972. Foreign exchamige rates were changing imi time direction timat made Amencmum goods hook chieaper, and at the same time foreign couimtries were producing less graimi, hess anchovies, and so on; so mmatmmraily' the demammd for American agricmmhtural products immereased mnarkedly. And we met timat denmand thirough very-large increases in the voinine of goods exported. Commseqmmemmtly, it should not be smmrprising that there were less goods amid services available for American eommsmmmers.
'lien late in 1973 tIme oil producimmg amid exportimmg countries outside time United States (called OPEC) took collusive action to bring ahommt a sharp immcrease in the world price of petroleum products. Let me digress -~m moment and characterize what had beemm goimmg omm. lhe OPEC group lmad beemm sehlimmg their oil output to time \\-'estemmm world coummtries at prices that now look qmmite how immdeed. Wtitim the revenmme received fronm oil, they pnrchmaseni goods and services from the W'estermm world. In other words, viewed in barter terms, they were exchanging curremit ommtput of oil for etmrrent goods ammni services prodmmeed by-others, By' agreeing to raise prices, the OPEC group, in effect, decided that they wanted to receive not only' claims to current output in the Western world in exchange for cmii, hut ahso claims to future output.
Time way' thmis takes place is thmat we wind up selhimmg sectmritics to timemmi, eitlmer eqimities or bonds, whmicim represent claims to our fmmtmmre prodnetion of goods and services. In a very' crude semise, \vc are mmow givnmg up somne of our fmstmsre pronlmmetion imm exchange for somne of timeir present oil. Even at time hiigher prices, apparemmtly we are willing to do so rather than accept the ahternative of reducing ommr current rate of oil consumption. Nevertheiess, the effects are the same: U. S. consumers have had a wealth loss. We have been made poorer by the actions of the OPEC cartel. The standard of living of American consumers has been reduced, and probably will grow at a slower rate, because of the higher price of oil. The effects of the higher price of oil and substitute sources of energy have created massive shifts in demands, and therefore relative prices, which has been a dominant factor in the developmemmts experienced in 1974.
The higher cost of energy, together with the environmental and safety laws, acts as a tax imposed upon the economic productive capacity of the United States. This means that the present value of the existing capital stock was reduced in much the same way as the value of the capital stock would decrease if the Government were to increase sharply the corporate tax rate. The decrease in the present value of the capital stock meamms that equity prices on the stock market decrease, reflecting the fact that the expected real earning power of com-porations has been reduced by these varied actions.
The decrease in the real economic capacity of the country is, by and harge, a one-time occurrence. However, the shifts in demand and changes in relative prices to adjust to a new equilibrium take some time to be fully completed. So far, this year has been one of four calendar quarters of shortages, sharp increases in the prices of mnany commodities, and a n-marked decrease in time reported volume of real output; but at the same time a continued high level of total employment. This latter development, a rather higim level of total civilian employment, is a development that I do not believe has received -sufficient attention this year. Time unemployment rate has been widely publicized, but time total number of persons employed has not been. The very sharp increase in time price level, even though about imaif time rate of inflation was transitory, did have the effect of redmmcing the stammdard of living of American consumers. That's part of the adjustment process. But becansd of the inflation, many persons who were not otherwise counted as part of our labor force -sucim as women, and young people -were induced to declare their intentions to seek jobs. More women found it desirable to work to supplement family income, and students chose to postpone ermtering or netmmrmmimmg to college. This increase imm time overall participation rate in the labor force was very large by imistoricah standards. Time imicrease in time participation rate was mucim faster than the ability of time ecommomy to absorb these new job-seekers.
Bmmt why dwell omm time fact timat about omme-half of the number of new persomms seekimmg jobs did not find them, while mmeglectimmg time fact timat omme-imaif of these new entrants into the labor market did fimid jobs. Since one of time inputs to productmon -energy -Imas increased sharply in cost, our ecommomic ammalysis tells us that time demand for other imiputs to produetiomm, smmch as labor, would immcrease simmce time cost of timese otlmer inputs hmave become -relatively chmeaper. Since time present value of the existing capital stock in the U. S. economy imas declined, timere is naturally' amm increase in time demand for additions to capital stock; and timerefore we have imad amm investment, or capital goods, boom timrougimout this year. That's what we would expect under the circumstances; and time fact that it takes quite a hit of time to put mmew plant and equipment in place immdicates to me that, in the short run, firms will seek more labor as a temporary substitute for capital as they try to maintain production while waiting to restore real economic capacity.
The so-cailed "real output" numbers derived from time m-mationai income accounts give us an idea about changes in time volume of goods and services produced over time, But if we are devoting a nmuehm larger proportion of our resources to the production of such things as a cleaner environment and safer working and living conditions, timen I believe it is appropriate to be skeptical of immterpretations of time falling real output as being solely indicative of a sluggish economy.
Look at what goes immto producimmg 1975 automobiles; in additiomi to the pollution control and safety devices on time automobile itself, there are environmental and safety restrictions imposed on the manufacturing process. And I timimmk thmat imi terms of inputs, the auto industry continued to command a very large share of our resources until very recently, even though the volume of outputs, measured simply as the number of cars, declined. \Vitlm timis analysis as background, let me turn to a few remarks about appropriate stabilization policy actions. On time one imamid there is a temptatiomi to want to do something about the 12 percent immflation, and on time othmer hammd timere is time desire to do sonmething about the failing real output amid rising unemploymemmt rate. According to my interpretation of time evemmts of time last few years. I believe that, withmout furtimer special actions omm time part of eitimer monetamy or fiscal ammtimorities, amidi commtimmuatiomm of mommetary' growtIm at time 1973-74 rates, time rate of inflation will decelerate nmarkedly mmext year to the rammge of 5 or 6 percemmt. At time sanme tinme, time growthm imm real output simould resume ammd I doubt that time rate of unenmploymemmt will rise as high as some analysts imave feared.
We imaye imad a wealth loss; our standard of living has declined, and our absolute real economic capacity is mmow lower timan it was a year ago. We should not seek policies designed to close the gap between what we are now prodncimmg and what could be immterpreted as being real potential before the energy crisis, tine environmental laws, the safety laws, the agricultural short-falls. amid SO 0mm. Tlmat is simply unobtaimiabie. Instead, we are forced to be satisfied to see a resumption of the growth rate of real output consistent with long-term growth trends in population, technology, and so forth -in other words, around three to four percemmt. But let me quickly add that this would also occur without any overt actions by government pohcymakers. As long as we do not suffer any further adverse shocks to the economy, I believe that the inherent stabilizing properties and the resiliency of the market system will return us to our potential growth path.
If Commgress wislmes to take son-me sort of action to immerease time total output of consumers' goods, then it will imave to thmimmk inn terms of relaxing the environnmemmtal ammd safety stammchards inmposed on industry generally ammd on specific commsumer products, such as ammtonmobiles. Shmort of timat, more spemmdimmg programs to sinmpiy' augniemmt aggregate chenmammd rumms the risk of creatimmg conditions ieadimmg to furtimer acceleration in our underlying, permanent rate of inflation.
